Table of contents:
1. The current riots in historical context
2. A discussion of the political implications for France right now
3. A good friend's intelligent response, with more on the political implications
1. HISTORICAL CONTEXT
There's a period in French history called 'les trente glorieuses.' It's not a sarcastic euphamism for the depression, but rather refers to the thirty years of economic prosperity that followed WW2, a period that ground to a halt with the oil shocks of the early 1970s. During this time, in France as in most of W Europe and N America, there was virtually full employment - that is, almost anyone could get a job without a problem. In fact, there were even shortages of cheap labour, so France imported an impressive amount from its former colonies, where there was a significant surplus of cheap labour. (This was especially true of Algeria, whose economic development policies were founded on high-tech, capital-intensive industrialization.)
How to house all these people was a big question. The solution was to build high-rises in the suburbs surrounding the major metropolises. These are called 'cités', and the poorest agglomeration of this type of his housing is in the North East of Paris, where the riots are now taking place. The model has been reproduced in smaller towns throughout France.
After the world went into recession in the 1970s (it's a little discussed fact that the entire globe, with maybe the exception of SE Asia, has suffered lower econ growth in the past 30 years than in the three decades previous; neoliberalism obviously looks pretty bad in this analysis...), unemployment rates began to rise. In countries lie France, where social protections enjoyed by the indiginous majority (read, white workers) made the labour market inflexible, umeployment rose even more dramatically. For over a decade unemployment has been over 10% in France, and has long been considered the major problem of that country. (It's worse, I believe, in Germany now, but this probably because of the integration of the Eastern half of the country.) Culturally, there was a lack of concerted effort to integrate immigrant populations, which were already physically isolated and which were excluded from the traditional structures of labour mobilization. The ZEP is an example of a French program that tried to isolate underperforming 'ghetto schools' to provide them with more funds and younger teachers in an effort to improve education there. ZEP, like its sister programs, has in fact completely failed to attain its objectives. The result is geographically concentrated areas of destitute immigrant population, though we're talking less about fresh immigrants than second-, and third-generation communities that have found themselves on the periphery of the French economy. That said, there are now many disenfranchised white working class people who, feeling abandoned by socialist and communist politicians, have veered to the extreme right.
As you all know from reading my previous writing, the last decade has been a strange one in French politics, culminating in the French right coming to power and the ultra-repressive Sarkozy leading the charge for the forces of rage. A lot of rioters are screaming out Sarko as they fight the police, and many youth in these neighbourhoods have offered up his name to explain the recent riots. But they are not spontaneous, in the traditional sense of the word. It's been years since the French police have been able to safely patrol the neighbourhoods that are now on fire. For one who is even dimly aware of the conditions in these neighbourhoods, the current violence is no surprise.
The current mess could also be compared to the LA race riots, where you have a simmering tension explode after a supposed act of police malfeasance. (In this case, two youth died and a third was nearly killed while running away from police - who, apparently, were in fact chasing a different band of hooligans...) Young men, as in American black ghettos, are the worst off.
2. POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS TODAY
In terms of the political implications, it looks like the war between centrist PM De Villepin (who is a Chirac loyalist; the two are from the 'Gaullist' tradition, which is like an authoritarian version of Canadian red toryism) and neo-liberal, police-state-loving Sarkozy. De Villepin and to a greater extent the rightwing (but also Arab ethnicity) minister of equal opportunities are urging community building and some form of compassion as a response - plus, of course, police-kept law and order. Sarko insists that we must call a spade a spade, or a trouble-making immigrant (or child of an immigrant) a scum. I haven't taken the time to examine in detail the socialist response, though no doubt it will be varied since in France, repressive racists are sprinkled throughout the political spectrum.
Anyway, Sarko, who is rumoured to be gay and whose wife recently left him for a publicist has clearly decided to run for President under the tough-guy banner, and Villepin to try as a more centrist, conciliatory candidate. Both will seek the nomination of their party, the UMP. Sarko is supported by about 90% of party members, whereas Villepin has more or less caught up on national ratings from the entire French populous. But unless Villepin can win over his own party, Sarko is still the most likely, at this moment, to be the right's presidential candidate.
I believe the socialists have more soft support in general, but lack a unifying, compelling personality on the order of Sarko or Villepin, which will make it hard for them to run a stellar presidential campaign. For instance, the socialist party membership was pro-constitution, but the socialist party voting base (much, much larger) was anti-. The most likely presidential candidates, Francois Hollande (former Jospin loyalist) and Dominique Strauss Khan (former finance minister and a Mitterand, Jospin loyalist), both belong to the socialist leadership that was fucked by Le Pen in 2002. Meanwhile, Fabius, lord of the constitutional no vote, has struggled to build popularity among the public or coalition partners within the socialist party. If these riots persist, however, they could displace Europe as a central political question and revive the fortunes of Le Pen and the extreme right. We may now see the socialists settle on a social policy in response that could reframe the debate.
3. AN INTELLIGENT EXTENSION OF THE DISCUSSION FROM A MAN ON THE SCENE
Inaki Mondragon (see blog roll), currently living in Paris, emailed me this response, which clarifies matters enormously.
Aldana,
Your analysis has been great for thinking about the unrest in the banlieu. What is most stunning to me right now is how minimal the impact has been on life here in Paris proper. The suburbs might be burning, and the government might be facing a crisis, but everything seems normal. Marseille and Lyon may have both sparked up, but these speculations feel remote from reality.
The socialists, at the moment, have no answer. Neither to the banlieu nor for France's problems in general. They seem unwilling to host primaries, and there's already talk of de Villepin facing Sarkozy in a presidential run-off.
Now, the Greens and the Commmunists have both called for Sarkozy's head, which is logical since he's seen as having intentionally provoked the outbursts. The socialists are getting ready to stage demonstrations this coming week, but are sounding as though they acutely sense their impotence. There's speculation of measures as extreme as the army being sent in. Sarko, it is thought, will let the situation escalate so he can win credit as the man who imposed order on the rabble.
Sarko, for his part, agrees with you and me when he notes that the French model has not worked for the past thirty years. His solution is fascism. But the socialists, for their part, will be stuck until they break decisively with Mitterand. The socialists can't march in the banlieu against Sarkozy because they also share some of the blame for the problem. I listened to a young socialist tonight insist that all the 5th Republic needs is a charismatic and strong leader. This sentiment is more intense in the senior party.
Ideally, this surge of outrage will transform into mass action by the left and the fall of the entire right-wing French Establishment. It has been pointed out to me that this is highly unlikely since no one's offering a positive alternative. So in the meanwhile, I must hope de Villepin can smooth the situation and buy the Left time to get its act together. But more likely is the depressing outcome that this is only the beginning, and that both the excluded immigrants, and more alarmingly, the Right, will escalate their rhetoric and their tactics.